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In this article, I argue that intentional psychology (i.e. the interpretation of
human behaviour in terms of intentional states and propositional attitudes) plays
an essential role in the sciences of the mind. However, this role is not one of
identifying scientifically respectable states of the world. Rather, I argue that
intentional psychology acts as a type of phenomenological model, as opposed to a
mechanistic one. I demonstrate that, like other phenomenological models in
science, intentional psychology is a methodological tool with its own benefits and
insights that complements our mechanistic understanding of systems. As a result,
intentional psychology’s distinctive scientific benefit is its ability to model systems
in unique, non-mechanistic, ways. This allows us to generate predictions that we
cannot otherwise generate using the mechanistic models of neuroscience and
cognitive psychology necessary for various scientific tasks.
Keywords: intentional psychology; mechanistic model; phenomenological model;
prediction; explanation
1. Introduction
Intentional psychology, sometimes called ‘folk’ psychology, is the interpretation and
explanation of human behaviour in terms of the attribution of intentional states or
propositional attitudes, such as beliefs, desires and intentions (as well as other mental
representations). Some argue that as a scientific explanation of human behaviour,
intentional psychology ought to be replaced by more capable scientific theories from
domains such as neuroscience and neurophysiology (Churchland 1981; Stich 1983;
Ramsey, Stich, and Garon 1990, and more recently Bickle 2003). Others argue that it is
essential to understand human cognition in virtue of identifying internal causal states of
systems (most famously Fodor 1975, 1987, 2008, but see also Putnam 1967 and Field
1978). In this article, I demonstrate that intentional psychology is essential to our
understanding of human cognition, but not in virtue of identifying scientifically
respectable states of the world. Instead, I propose a characterisation of intentional
psychology as a phenomenological model, and demonstrate that it is an indispensible
complement to the mechanistic explanations of behaviour provided by neuroscience and
neurophysiology.
Phenomenological models are commonly used in science to generate predictions, as
well as perform other tasks, that cannot be accomplished using mechanistic models which
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identify the structure and causal features of systems. By analogy, intentional descriptions
work in conjunction with mechanistic descriptions in our scientific study of the mind, each
with a different scientific burden to bear. Both mechanistic and phenomenological models
have an integral role to play in scientific inquiry, and neither can be eliminated from
scientific methodology in favour of the other.
In the next section, I provide an outline of the distinction between mechanistic and
phenomenological models in science. In Section 3, I provide a brief sketch of the
arguments traditionally raised against the scientific merits of intentional psychology, and
show how interpreting it as a phenomenological model overcomes these arguments.
Finally, in Section 4, I demonstrate that intentional psychology, understood in this way, is
an essential tool in our scientific study of the mind. It is neither threatened by, nor an
extension of, our mechanistic accounts of human behaviour. Instead, like other
phenomenological models in science, it is a methodological tool with its own benefits
and insights that complements our mechanistic interpretations of systems.
2. Mechanistic models versus phenomenological models
2.1. Mechanistic models
Models serve a variety of purposes within science, from hypothesis testing to analysing
data. One critical purpose of models, however, is to provide explanations. The sorts of
models we use to provide explanations often depends on the sorts of questions that we are
interested in answering, and the scientific domain in which we are working. When trying to
provide explanations in scientific disciplines pertaining to the mind – disciplines such as
neuroscience, cognitive science and cognitive psychology – the type of model typically
considered ideal for explanations is a mechanistic model (Machamer, Darden, and Craver
2000; Bechtel 2005, 2008; Glennan 2005; Craver 2006; Wimsatt 2007; Thagard 2009, 2012;
Eliasmith 2010). Mechanistic models provide explanations by demonstrating how objects
within a system interact so as to produce some phenomenon. A rather straightforward
example, offered by Machamer et al. (2000, p. 3), is the phenomenon of chemical
neurotransmission:
in the [case] of chemical neurotransmission, a presynaptic neuron transmits a signal to a post-
synaptic neuron by releasing neurotransmitter molecules that diffuse across the synaptic cleft,
bind to receptors, and so depolarize the post-synaptic cell.
In order to provide a complete explanation of chemical neurotransmission, we must
understand the various aspects of the mechanism that produces it. First and foremost, we
must identify the entities involved in the production of the phenomenon. In this case, the
entities would be the presynaptic neuron, the post-synaptic neuron, the neurotransmitter
molecules, the receptors and the post-synaptic cell. Similarly, we must identify how these
entities are situated spatially and temporally within the mechanism. This includes
identifying the ‘relative locations, shapes, sizes, orientations, connections, and boundaries
of the mechanisms components’ (Craver and Bechtel 2006, p. 470). The way in which the
parts are structured and placed within the mechanism determines how they can interact
with one another in order to produce the relevant phenomenon.
Next, we must identify how the different parts work together. In the above example,
the presynaptic neuron transmits a signal by releasing neurotransmitter molecules.
These molecules diffuse across the synaptic cleft and bind to receptors, depolarising the
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post-synaptic cell. These interactions bring about the phenomenon we are trying to explain
(the neurotransmission of chemicals).
A mechanistic model is, therefore, explanatory when it identifies four major
components: The phenomenon (the thing in need of explaining), the parts (the relevant
components within the system), the organisation (the relevant way in which the parts are
situated spatially and temporally within the system) and the activities (the interactions and
processes that go on between the component parts in order to produce the phenomenon).
By identifying these four components, mechanistic models can explain how the
phenomenon is being produced by the system. With this rough sketch of mechanistic
models in hand, we now have a general set of criteria with which to distinguish mechanistic
models from non-mechanistic ones.
2.2. Phenomenological models
Providing mechanistic explanations is a common goal in the behavioural sciences, but it is
not the only goal. We use non-mechanistic models for a variety of different purposes in the
sciences of the mind. They can describe phenomena in need of explanation, measure or
calculate crucial quantities, make predictions, summarise data and function as heuristics
for designing experiments (Bogen 2005, p. 401; Craver 2006, p. 355). Such models
primarily characterise or describe some phenomenon without attempting to
decompose it into parts and operations for better understanding. These phenomenological
models play an important role in science different from their mechanistic cousins.
Consider Hodgkin and Huxley’s mathematical model of the action potential in the squid
giant axon:
[This] model is derived in part from the laws of physics and chemistry, such as Ohm’s
law, Coulomb’s law and the Nernst equation, and it can be used to derive myriad electrical
features of many different kinds of neurons in many different species. Despite
this accomplishment, the authors insist that their model is not an explanation.
(Craver 2006, p. 356)
Despite the appearance of a mechanistic explanation, Hodgkin and Huxley’s model
makes no ontological commitments about the underlying mechanisms that produce the
time course of the action potential in the squid giant axon. It merely characterises and
predicts important electrical features of those neurons. Despite not being explanatory in
the way many scientists studying the mind are interested in, the model has proven
extremely important and predictive. Identifying mathematical dependencies is extremely
beneficial, even if it does not mechanistically explain the phenomenon it describes. As
another example, consider the use of a specific form of dynamic systems theory in
cognitive science:
What came to be called dynamical systems theory (DST) enables investigators to visualize the
change in the state of a system over time. The simplest case is a plot of the states traversed by a
system through time, that is, the system’s trajectory through state space. Each dimension of
state space corresponds to one variable of the system, and each point in the space corresponds
to one of the possible states of the system. (Bechtel 2008, p. 187)
By applying the appropriate set of differential equations, we can predict the trajectory
of the system through this state space. Dynamical models have been used in cognitive
science to describe and predict cognitive phenomena like the production of speech (Port
2003) and the movement of animals (Kelso 1995). What is important to note about such
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models, however, is that they often characterise and predict the behaviour of cognitive
systems without appealing to underlying causal mechanisms. Instead, it is ‘usually only
observable behaviour [that] is mapped to the model’ (Eliasmith 2010, p. 319). In this
respect, these dynamical models act as phenomenological models, providing no mecha-
nistic explanation for the behaviour of the system. Despite this, such models have played a
significant role in our scientific study of cognitive systems.
It is also important to note that even though they do not provide mechanistic
explanations, phenomenological models still provide some degree of explanatory power.
Consider what it means to explain a mechanistic system: ‘explanations afford the ability to
say not merely how the system in fact behaves, but to say how it will behave under a
variety of interventions’ (Craver 2006, p. 358). The use of phenomenological models still
allows us to determine a limited range of counterfactual behaviours in virtue of being
predictively adequate. In this respect, such models can provide us with limited
explanations, even in contexts where they do not match the explanatory power provided
by mechanistic models.
3. The role of intentional psychology in the behavioural sciences
3.1. Reasons to doubt intentional psychology’s scientific merits
A great deal of criticism has been raised over the past few decades regarding the scientific
value of intentional psychology. Churchland (1981, pp. 68–76), for example, argues that
intentional psychology is an explanatorily deficient account of human action. Among the
common mental phenomena that intentional psychology cannot explain are: mental
illness, creative imagination, the nature and function of sleep, memory, perceptual illusions
and the learning process (Churchland 1981, p. 73). In virtue of this, he proposes that it fails
as an adequate theory of human action, and should be replaced.
Similarly, Stich (1983, p. 101) argues that even when intentional psychology works at
explaining and predicting systems, it fails the moment we apply it to systems in exotic
circumstances. The use of intentional psychology, for example, can explain and predict the
behaviour of people in particular kinds of societies, but fails when we apply it to people in
radically different types of societies. It therefore cannot be relied upon to be a consistent
explanatory or predictive tool for scientific purposes.
A different sort of argument is that the attribution of intentional states to systems is an
inherently normative practice. Put another way, when we describe a system using
intentional psychology, we attribute to it a set of intentional states that we feel it ought to
have if it were a rational agent in that scenario. This means that ‘an element of
interpretation, and dramatic interpretation at that, must be recognized in any use of the
intentional vocabulary’ (Dennett 1987, p. 342). As a result, attributions are not made
based on any empirical facts about the structure of the system, since the same physical
system can always be interpreted as having vastly different sets of intentional states (e.g.
different sets of beliefs, desires, goals, etc.) that will be compatible with its behaviour. Thus
a physical description of a system will always be compatible with numerous different
intentional interpretations. Given this normative and interpretative feature of intentional
descriptions, intentional psychology appears ill-suited to play a role in the empirical
sciences that work explicitly with physical descriptions. Quine (1960, p. 218) seems to have
this in mind when he tells us that ‘the underlying methodology of the idioms of
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propositional attitudes contrasts strikingly with the spirit of objective science at its most
representative’.
Finally, it is questioned whether we need intentional attributions in science at all. In the
past, it was common for people to attribute intentional states to natural phenomena such
as the wind, fire, rivers and mountains (Dennett 1969, p. 89; Churchland 1981, p. 74); yet,
over time we have learned to easily and conveniently predict such phenomena far better
and more accurately without such intentional terminology. A completed neuroscience may
very well allow us to do the same when predicting human action (Churchland 1981; Stich
1983; Ramsey et al. 1990; Bickle 2003). So, how might intentional idioms be critical to
scientific progress?
3.2. Intentional psychology as a phenomenological model
The first thing to note about intentional psychology is that it tells us very little about the
underlying structure of systems. To speak of a system in terms of its beliefs or its mental
representations does not tell us what mechanisms are generating its behaviour. As Dennett
(1987, p. 48) notes, ‘we find that we all use [intentional] psychology knowing next to
nothing about what actually happens inside people’s skulls’. But while intentional
psychology may not identify structural features of systems, it can be remarkably good at
predicting systems (Dennett 1971, 1987, 1991; Churchland 1981, pp. 72–73; Fodor 1987,
p. 3; Clark 1988; Lahav 1992; Cummins 2000, p. 131; Bechtel 2007, p. 194). This means
that our use of intentional psychology to predict systems does not require that we adopt
any ontological commitments about the structure of the system we are predicting:
[D]eciding on the basis of available evidence that something is (to be treated as) an Intentional
system permits predictions having a normative or logical basis rather than an empirical one,
and hence the success of an Intentional prediction, based as it is on no particular picture of the
system’s design, cannot be construed to confirm or disconfirm any particular pictures of the
system’s design. (Dennett 1971, p. 97)
Intentional psychology interprets and predicts the phenomenon of human action
without providing a mechanistic explanation for it. This is exactly what phenomenological
models do: ‘They are complete black boxes: they reveal nothing about the underlying
mechanisms and so merely ‘save the phenomenon’ to be explained’ (Craver 2006, p. 360).
But if intentional psychology functions as a phenomenological model, then this would
imply that intentional descriptions are not the sort of explanations that scientists studying
the mind commonly seek, since they do not describe causal mechanisms. Yet, intentional
states seem to be invoked in our explanations of human action all the time. I can explain
Jane’s absence from my party due to her being angry with me. Similarly, I might explain
why my dog barked at a quick moving shadow in terms of his believing the shadow was an
animal. In these cases, intentional descriptions play a large role in our explanations. Thus
it appears, at least prima facie, that we do not treat intentional psychology as a type of
phenomenological model.
I propose that this is not, in fact, a problem for the account I provide. Intentional
psychology still provides us with limited explanations when searching for mechanisms, in
exactly the same way phenomenological models provide us with a degree of explanatory
power:
Because phenomenal models summarize the phenomenon to be explained, they typically allow
one to answer some [‘what-if-things-had-been-different’]-questions. But [a more complete]
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explanation shows why the relations are as they are in the phenomenal model, and so reveals
conditions under which those relations might change or fail to hold altogether. (Craver 2006,
p. 358)
We see just this sort of thing when talking in terms of intentional states. To explain my
dog’s behaviour in terms of his beliefs does not show why his beliefs are as they are. Nor
does it reveal how or why those beliefs change or cease to exist under different
circumstances. But in virtue of being predictive, it allows us to explain in a limited fashion.
In order to provide a more complete explanation of his behaviour, however, we must
understand the internal neurological mechanisms that causally produce the regularities in
behaviour that we describe in terms of intentional states. Intentional psychology identifies
regularities in the system’s interactions in the world (Dennett 1991; Bechtel 2007, p. 194),
but does not describe the underlying structure of the system that produces them.
3.3. Responses to objections and criticisms
Given the limited explanatory power of phenomenological models in the life sciences,
Churchland’s objection to intentional psychology on the grounds that it lacks explanatory
power loses some of its sting. The fact that intentional attributions cannot explain a
number of mental phenomena is not grounds for elimination, since phenomenological
models are often not used to provide such explanations.
Even though an intentional model posits mental states and objects that may not
be neurologically plausible, this does not damage its usefulness as a predictive model.
As Craver (2006, p. 361) tells us, ‘for those who merely want to predict the target
system’s performance, biologically implausible simulations will work just fine’. It is
only when we go in search of mechanistic explanations that such models become
insufficient.
Viewing intentional psychology as a phenomenological model allows us to avoid other
criticisms levelled against it as well. Consider Stich’s criticism that intentional psychology
fails as a predictive model since it cannot be used to accurately predict a system in unusual
situations. This limitation on applicability is not, in fact, a sign that intentional psychology
fails as a useful scientific tool. On the contrary, this is a rather common characteristic of
phenomenological models. Given that such models abstract away all the structural details
of the system being modelled, they will often only be useful within a constrained set of
situations:
One might, for example, build a model that is useful only within a narrow range of conditions
(such as health, proper functioning or the absence of disturbing outside forces), but that fails
outside of those narrow conditions. For example, one might provide a model of verb-tense
generation that performs perfectly well when the brain and vocal cords are working properly,
but that provides no insight into how the system will behave if something breaks or if the
system is in extreme environmental conditions. (Craver 2006, p. 357)
As a phenomenological model, intentional attributions will work extremely well in
particular sorts of environments and situations, just not others. This is not a sufficient
reason for elimination, however, or else we would have to throw out all phenomenological
models in science.
As for the objection that intentional psychology is inherently normative and thus
inappropriate for use in empirical scientific practice, this assumes that the only types of
descriptions that belong in our rigorous scientific study of the mind are those that
6 E. Hochstein
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [E
ric
 H
oc
hs
tei
n]
 at
 09
:07
 04
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
12
 
explicitly identify the structure and causal interactions of systems. But this is simply
untrue. Even if we grant that such descriptions are the sorts of descriptions we are
searching for when explaining mental phenomena, this does not imply that only such
descriptions are relevant to scientific inquiry involving the mind. If it did, then statistical
models would be equally banished from our scientific methodology, since they too do not
describe the physical constitution and causal interactions of systems. Instead, such models
only ‘focus on describing the regularities in the data’ that we collect about a given system,
and so ‘are silent with respect to the particular physical implementation’ (Eliasmith 2010,
p. 315). In this regard, they too involve an element of interpretation. Yet, such models
have an undeniably crucial role in our scientific methodology. The normative aspect of
intentional descriptions does not change the fact that intentional models are predictive.
And it is qua predictive model that such descriptions are important to our scientific
methodology, not qua empirical/normative model (as is the case with statistical models).
In fact, intentional characterisations bear a family resemblance to statistical charac-
terisations. Both act as a type of phenomenological model. Phenomenological models
come in all shapes and sizes after all. Certain types of dynamical models, as we saw, act as
phenomenological models. Statistical models, meanwhile, act as different sorts of
phenomenological models. Unlike dynamical models, statistical models predict by
describing ‘the probability of various measureable states of the system given other
known states of the system’ (Eliasmith 2010, p. 315). Similarly, intentional characterisa-
tions are simply another flavour of phenomenological model. They are relevantly similar
to both statistical and dynamical models in virtue of remaining agnostic as to the physical
implementation of the system being described and predicted. However, instead of basing
predictions on dynamic systems theory, or probability theory, they predict based on the
tenets of rationality.1
The fact that various types of phenomenological models predict in different ways
means that each is useful in different contexts (Eliasmith 2010). The lack of explicit
quantification makes intentional models ideal for predictions in contexts where quanti-
fication is either not possible, or difficult to determine. This makes them ideal for
situations where statistical and dynamical models are unavailable and/or uninformative.
Intentional models allow us to make predictions without having to quantify over features
of the system that we may not know how to measure. In this regard, intentional models
have their place among the ranks of other phenomenological models with their own role
and benefits.
4. Why settle for the phenomenological?
Even if we grant that intentional psychology can be characterised as a phenomenological
model, the preceding discussion does seem to be dancing around the main issue: If a
mechanistic model of human action is available to us through neuroscience or
neurophysiology, do we really need intentional psychology for scientific predictions? In
this section, I argue that the mechanistic models found in these domains are insufficient to
fill the scientific role played by an intentional model.
4.1. Phenomenological models can generate predictions that mechanistic models cannot
If we view models as scientific tools, then different tools may be necessary for different
tasks and the model that is best for explanations will not necessarily be the best
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for predictions. And indeed, there are clear cases where phenomenological models
outperform their mechanistic counterparts when it comes to predictions. Consider, for
example, two different ways of modelling the behaviour of water. One which models water
based on its atomic constituents and how they causally interact to produce behaviour, and
the other which says nothing about the mechanisms responsible for the behaviour and only
describes behavioural regularities:
If one is studying diffusion or Brownian motion, one adopts a molecular perspective in
which water is regarded as a collection of particles. [. . .] However, if one’s concern is the
behavior of water flowing through pipes, the best-fitting models are generated within a
perspective that models water as a continuous fluid. Thus, one’s theoretical perspective on the
nature of water depends on the kind of problem one faces. Employing a plurality of
perspectives has a solid pragmatic justification. There are different problems to be solved, and
neither perspective by itself provides adequate resources for solving all the problems.
(Giere 2006, p. 34)
In the case of water’s movement through pipes, the use of a phenomenological
model allows us to predict and describe the behaviour of water better than the
mechanistic model. The model that is best for explaining why water moves (in terms of
molecular motion) is not necessarily the ideal model for predictions. Similarly, there are
compelling reasons to think that intentional models are better suited to certain scientific
tasks than the mechanistic models we use in our neurological and physiological
explanations.
To demonstrate, consider the stagnation in the neuroscience of vision that took place
in the 1960s and 1970s. According to Marr, a strictly mechanistic understanding of vision
proved unfruitful until neuroscientists realised the need to adopt a different perspective
about the system, and what it was doing. More specifically, the neuroscience of vision was
only able to proceed when neuroscientists began attributing intentional content to
neurological mechanisms (Marr 1982; Bechtel 2008, pp. 24–28). Certain neurons, for
example, were found to contain visual information about the edges and boundaries of seen
objects. This information, according to Marr (1982, p. 19), needed to be ‘analyzed and
understood in a way that [was] independent of the particular mechanisms and structures
that implement them in our head’. And as Dennett (1971, p. 90) rightly points out, the
‘possession of information or misinformation is just as Intentional a notion as that of
belief’. Only by taking an intentional interpretation of the system, and attributing
intentional content to neurological mechanisms could we proceed in making essential
predictions. In this regard, intentional models go hand-in-hand with mechanistic models in
our best scientific practice, each contributing to the study of the mind in ways the other is
not well suited for.
4.2. Phenomenological models are necessary for generating mechanistic models
Despite not explicitly describing mechanisms, intentional psychological descriptions are an
essential tool in our scientific discovery and understanding of mechanisms. One of the
primary uses of phenomenological models is precisely in helping to construct mechanistic
ones. According to Bogen (2005, p. 401), phenomenological models are often used to
‘suggest and sharpen questions about causal mechanisms’, ‘suggest constraints on
acceptable explanations’ and ‘support inductive inferences without which mechanisms
could not be successfully studied’. In a similar vein, the attribution of intentional states to
systems allows us to better understand ‘the task being performed by the [. . .] system, why it
8 E. Hochstein
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needs to be performed, and the constraints the task itself places on how it is performed’
(Bechtel 2008, p. 26). This provides us with insights into the physical implementation of
the system being described.
With this in mind, Bechtel points out that there are two methods of intervening in a
mechanistic system in order to learn about it. One involves going inside the system and
altering the relevant parts and operations to see what results. The other involves altering
only the environmental conditions in which the system is placed, and observing the
regularities in the overall behaviour caused by those environmental changes:
‘Each of these modes of intervention and detection provides different information about
mental mechanisms. None of them alone provides a direct and complete account; rather, each
is partial and potentially misleading’ (Bechtel 2008, pp. 38–39).
Describing the spatiotemporal parts and operations working inside a system very often
tells us little about the possible environmental conditions in which the mechanism will be
placed, and so cannot tell us the behavioural regularities of entire systems in different
environmental situations:
The behaviour an entity exhibits is often dependent upon context and there is no reason to
think that the account of an entity offered by any inquiry considers how it will behave under
all conditions but only those which are the focus of inquiry. As engineers are well aware, how a
component will behave when inserted into a particular kind of system often needs to be
investigated empirically. (Bechtel 2008, p. 22)
Meanwhile, it is the very purpose of intentional models to characterise how entire
systems behave in various sorts of situations and environments, and to identify
behavioural regularities. According to Bechtel (2007, p. 10), intentional psychology
‘characterises regularities in the way cognitive agents respond to situations arising in their
environment’. A similar point is made by Dennett (1987, p. 257), who claims that
intentional psychology ‘is well-suited to describe, in predictive, fruitful and illuminating
ways, the cognitive prowess of creatures in their environments’. The lesson to take away
from this is that descriptions in terms of objects and operations must be supplemented by
intentional descriptions since both provide insights that the other lacks, and both play a
key role in explaining and learning about mechanistic systems.
5. Conclusion
I have argued that intentional psychology is best understood as playing the role of a
phenomenological model in our scientific study of the mind. Those who strive for a
reductive or eliminative account of intentional concepts within science must be cautious.
As a predictive tool, intentional attributions may play an indispensible role in helping to
construct a complete mechanistic explanation of psychology, and thus are useful in ways
that mechanistic models are not. A plurality of models are useful precisely because they do
a plurality of things.
Similarly, even if we supposed that a completed mechanistic model could, in principle,
be used in place of an intentional one, we rarely abandon useful and predictive models in
science simply because we think a far more complex and unwieldy model gets the ontology
more accurate. We talk about light in terms of ‘rays’ when studying optics, even though we
do not think this accurately captures the ontology of light. We model electricity as though
it were a continuous entity with ‘flow’ and ‘current’ when modelling electrical circuits,
instead of a massive collection of electrons moving along a track (or as small clouds of
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probability as quantum mechanics suggests). We similarly use Newtonian physics in many
cases instead of the more fundamental and accurate quantum mechanics. In a similar vein,
intentional psychology (construed as a phenomenological model) has an important
scientific role to play, and the construction of more detailed mechanistic models will not
challenge that.
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Note
1. Some might object to this suggestion of a family resemblance between intentional and statistical
models. After all, while statistical models are based on the well-defined axioms of probability
theory, the axioms of rationality (on which intentional attributions seem to be based) are not so
apparent. It is questionable whether there even are any clearly definable axioms of rationality.
When we predict the behaviour of others, we do so without any explicit understanding of what
such axioms might be. In this respect, intentional models may be too different in kind from
statistical models to warrant inclusion into the class of phenomenological models. The
problem with this sort of objection is twofold. First, it is a mistake to think that all domains to
which statistical models are applied are therefore axiomatised. That there are statistical axioms
does not mean that any particular statistical model (e.g. of stock markets) is also axiomatised in
the relevant respect. We do not, for instance, have the axioms of stock market behaviour just
because we have a statistical model of the stock markets. You could, after all, have a statistical
model of rationality. Second, and more importantly, this sort of objection is a red-herring.
Even if we assume that there are no explicit axioms of rationality (which is still up for debate), it
is hardly a necessary characteristic of phenomenological models that they be based on axioms.
That was never the claim. Intentional models are, however, relevantly like statistical models in
key respects: First, they are predictively valuable in scientific practice. Second, they make
predictions without telling us structural or mechanistic details of the system. Third, they are
often used to identify patterns and regularities in behaviour produced by mechanistic systems.
Finally, they are used in conjunction with mechanistic models to provide more complete
understandings of systems. These similarities provide us with compelling reasons to consider
intentional characterisations as a species of phenomenological model, just as statistical models
are.
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